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 
Abstract 
An algorithm for 𝑛 − 1-strong-equillibrium for distributed consensus in a ring with rational agents was proposed by Afek et al. 
[1]. A proof of impossibility of 𝑛 − 1-strong-equillibrium for distributed consensus in every topology with rational agents, when 
𝑛 is even, is presented.  
Furthermore, we show that the only algorithm which can solve the problem when 𝑛 is odd is the one proposed in [1]. 
Finally, we prove that the proposed algorithm provides a 𝑛 − 2-strong-equillibrium in a synchronous ring when 𝑛 is even.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The problem of distributed consensus, where 𝑛 processors, some of which may be faulty, have to agree on the same 
value which is also an input to one of them, has been well studied [3-7]. More recently, there is growing interest in the 
model of distributed computing with rational agents which may deviate from a distributed algorithm in order to affect 
the result of the algorithm [8-12]. 
The main concern regarding distributed computation with rational agents is to provide an algorithm which is resilient 
to rational agents, meaning that rational agents would gain nothing by deviating from the protocol. In order to address 
this more formally, Afek et al. use the following definitions (refer to [1] for full details): 
Definition 1 (Utility Function). Let 𝐴 be a distributed algorithm, and 𝑂 be the set of all possible final states of 𝐴. Let 
𝑝 be an agent, then 𝑢𝑝: 𝑂 → ℝ is the utility function, such that ∀𝑜 ∈ 𝑂, 𝑢𝑝(𝑜) is the profit 𝑝 would gain from reaching 
the final state 𝑜. 
Definition 2 (Solution Preference). Let 𝐴 be a distributed algorithm, and 𝑂 be the set of all possible final states of 𝐴. 
Let 𝑝 be an agent, and 𝑢𝑝 be its utility function, then 𝑢𝑝 satisfy the solution preference iff ∀𝑜𝐿, 𝑜𝐸 ∈ 𝑂 such that 𝑜𝐿 is 
a legal final state of 𝐴 and 𝑜𝐸 is an erroneous final state of 𝐴, 𝑢𝑝(𝑜𝐿) ≥ 𝑢𝑝(𝑜𝐸). 
Definition 3 (K-Strong-Equilibrium).  Let 𝐴 be a distributed algorithm, and 𝑃 the set of processors, then 𝐴 reaches k-
strong equilibrium iff ∀𝐶 ⊆ 𝑃, such that |𝐶| ≤ 𝑘, for every 𝑝 ∈ 𝐶 the following holds: 
𝔼[𝑢𝑝|𝐶 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐴] ≤ 𝔼[𝑢𝑝|𝐶 𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑠 𝐴] 
The problem of distributed consensus with rational agents is addressed in [1] and in [2]. In the model proposed in [1], 
some processors may prefer a certain outcome of the protocol, i.e. that all processors eventually agree on the value 1 
or that all agree on the value 0.  
Afek et al. propose in [1] an algorithm providing a 𝑛 − 1-strong-equilibrium for the problem of distributed consensus 
with rational agents in a synchronous ring. The algorithm is presented in IV. 
In this paper we show that this algorithm fails in case 𝑛 is even. Moreover, we show that a 𝑛 − 1-strong-equilibrium 
is unattainable when 𝑛 is even, in every topology (II). Nonetheless, we prove that it is the only algorithm that provides 
a 𝑛 − 1-strong-equilibrium in a synchronous ring, when 𝑛 is odd (III), and that the algorithm does provide a 𝑛 − 2-
strong-equilibrium in a synchronous ring (IV). 
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II. IMPOSSIBILITY OF 𝑛 − 1-STRONG-EQUILIBRIUM WHEN 𝑛 IS EVEN 
Definition 4 (Input Cheaters). Let 𝐴 be an algorithm for distributed consensus and let 𝐶 be a coalition of cheaters, 
then 𝐶 are input cheaters iff 𝐶 run 𝐴 but may act as if they have a different set of inputs than they are actually given. 
 
Theorem 1 (Impossibility of 𝑛 − 1-Strong-Equilibrium). Assuming uniform distribution over the inputs, there is no 
algorithm for distributed consensus, in every topology, providing a 𝑛 − 1-strong-equilibrium when 𝑛 (the number 
of nodes) is even. 
 
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there is an algorithm 𝐴 that provides a 𝑛 − 1-strong-equillibrium. 
Given a coalition of size 𝑛 − 1, denote the single node which is not part of this coalition by 𝑣, and the group of nodes 
in the coalition (i.e. 𝑉/{𝑣}) by 𝐶. 
We will show that even when we bound 𝐶 to be input cheaters, 𝐴 will fail to provide a 𝑛 − 1-strong-equillibrium. 
We will use the following notations: 
1. 𝐷(𝑢) – The value decided by a node 𝑢 when it finishes to run 𝐴. 
2. 𝐽(𝑢) – The input that a node 𝑢 ∈ 𝐶 pretends to have. 
3. 𝐼(𝑢) – The input a node 𝑢 is given (before it starts running 𝐴). 
4. 𝐼(𝐶) = (𝐼(𝑢))
𝐶
, i.e. the set of inputs given to the nodes of 𝐶. 
5. 𝐽(𝐶) = (𝐽(𝑢))
𝐶
, i.e. the set of inputs that the nodes of 𝐶 pretend to have. 
6. For 𝑗: 𝐶 → {0,1} define 𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠(𝑗) = |{𝑢 ∈ 𝐶|𝑗(𝑢) = 1}| 
 
Assume 𝐼(𝑣) = 1 and ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝐶: 𝐽(𝑢) = 1, then by validity attribute of consensus 𝐷(𝑣) = 1 is deduced (since 𝑣 cares 
only about 𝐽(𝐶) and cannot know that 𝐼(𝐶) ≠ 𝐽(𝐶)). 
Formally, 
(1) ℙ(𝐷(𝑣) = 1|𝐼(𝑣) = 1, 𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠(𝐽(𝐶)) = |𝐶|) = 1 
And similarly, 
(2) ℙ(𝐷(𝑣) = 0|𝐼(𝑣) = 0, 𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠(𝐽(𝐶)) = 0) = 1 
Define 𝛼(𝑗) the parity of 𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠(𝑗), i.e. 𝛼(𝑗) ≝ 𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠(𝑗) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 2. 
 
Lemma 1.1. Assume 𝐶 runs 𝐴 with 𝐽(𝐶) = 𝑗, then 𝐷(𝑣) = ¬(𝐼(𝑣) ⊕ 𝛼(𝑗)). 
 
Proof. We will prove the lemma by backwards induction on 𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠(𝑗). If 𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠(𝑗) = 𝑛 − 1, then 𝛼(𝑗) = 1. 
If 𝐼(𝑣) = 1 then using (1) we conclude 𝐷(𝑣) = 1, and indeed 1 = ¬(1 ⊕ 1). 
Otherwise, 𝐼(𝑣) = 0. Assume that 𝐼(𝐶) = (0, … ,0) and that ∀𝑝 ∈ 𝐶: 𝑢𝑝(0) = 0, 𝑢𝑝(1) = 1 i.e. every player in 𝐶 
prefers that 𝐷(𝑣) = 1. 
If 𝐶 did not cheat, their expected utilization was:  
(3) 𝔼[𝑢𝑝|𝐽(𝐶) = 𝐼(𝐶)] = ℙ(𝐷(𝑣) = 1|𝐽(𝐶) = (0)𝐶) =1 ℙ(𝐼(𝑣) = 1) ⋅
ℙ(𝐷(𝑣) = 1|𝐽(𝐶) = (0)𝐶 , 𝐼(𝑣) = 1) ≤ ℙ(𝐼(𝑣) = 1) =
1
2
 
Where =1 is a result of (2). 
On the other hand, if 𝐶 cheated with 𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠(𝑗)  = 𝑛 − 1 , i.e. 𝑗 = (1)𝐶, then their expected utilization was: 
(4) 𝔼[𝑢𝑝|𝐽(𝐶) = (1)𝐶] = ℙ(𝐷(𝑣) = 1|𝐽(𝐶) = (1)𝐶) = ℙ(𝐷(𝑣) = 1|𝐽(𝐶) = (1)𝐶 , 𝐼(𝑣) = 1) ⋅
ℙ(𝐼(𝑣) = 1) + ℙ(𝐷(𝑣) = 1|𝐽(𝐶) = (1)𝐶 , 𝐼(𝑣) = 0) ⋅ ℙ(𝐼(𝑣) = 0) =
1
2
+
1
2
ℙ(𝐷(𝑣) = 1|𝐽(𝐶) = (1)𝐶 , 𝐼(𝑣) = 0) 
Since 𝐴 provides a 𝑛 − 1-strong-equillibrium then 𝐶 should not benefit from cheating. Formally,  
(5) ∀𝑝 ∈ 𝐶: 𝔼[𝑢𝑝|𝐼(𝐶) = 𝐽(𝐶)] ≥  𝔼[𝑢𝑝|𝐽(𝐶) = (1)𝐶] 
Combining (3), (4) and (5) we have  
(6) ∀𝑝 ∈ 𝐶:
1
2
≥ 𝔼[𝑢𝑝|𝐼(𝐶) = 𝐽(𝐶)] ≥  𝔼[𝑢𝑝|𝐽(𝐶) = (1)𝐶] =
1
2
+
1
2
ℙ(𝐷(𝑣) = 1|𝐽(𝐶) = (1)𝐶 , 𝐼(𝑣) = 0) 
Hence, ℙ(𝐷(𝑣) = 1|𝐽(𝐶) = (1)𝐶 , 𝐼(𝑣) = 0) = 0, thus 𝐷(𝑣) = 0. Indeed 0 = ¬(0 ⊕ 1). 
We will assume the statements hold for 𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠(𝑗) = 𝑘 and prove it for 𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠(𝑗) = 𝑘 − 1. 
Consider the first case 𝛼(𝑗) = 0, i.e. 𝑘 𝑚𝑜𝑑 2 = 1. 
If 𝐼(𝑣) = 1 then consider a node 𝑢 ∈ 𝐶 such that 𝐽(𝑢) = 0 (there must be such 𝑢 because 𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠(𝑗) < 𝑛 − 1). Note 
that since 𝐶 are input cheaters, 𝑢 is in the same situation as 𝑣 is in case 𝐼(𝑣) = 0 and 𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠(𝑗) = 𝑘, except that 𝑢 is in 
the coalition and 𝑣 is not. Of course, 𝑣 cannot know this, therefore applying the induction hypothesis where 𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠(𝑗) =
𝑘 and 𝐼(𝑣) = 0, 𝑣 may locally deduce that 𝐷(𝑢) = 0. Using agreement property of consensus, we have 𝐷(𝑣) = 0. 
Indeed  0 = ¬(1 ⊕ 0). 
If 𝐼(𝑣) = 0 then we can assume that 𝐼(𝐶) = (1)𝐶 and that ∀𝑝 ∈ 𝐶: 𝑢𝑝(0) = 1, 𝑢𝑝(1) = 0 i.e. every player in 𝐶 
prefers that 𝐷(𝑣) = 0. If 𝐶 did not cheat, their expected utilization was: 
𝔼[𝑢𝑝|𝐽(𝐶) = 𝐼(𝐶)] = ℙ(𝐷(𝑣) = 0|𝐽(𝐶) = (1)𝐶) =1 ℙ(𝐷(𝑣) = 0|𝐽(𝐶) = (1)𝐶 , 𝐼(𝑣) = 0) ⋅ ℙ(𝐼(𝑣) = 0)
≤ ℙ(𝐼(𝑣) = 0) =
1
2
 
Where =1 is a result of (1). 
Notice that from the case 𝐼(𝑣) = 1 above, ℙ(𝐷(𝑣) = 0|𝐽(𝐶) = 𝑗, 𝐼(𝑣) = 1) = 1 follows. Therefore, if 𝐶 did cheat, 
the expected utilization of 𝐶 was: 
𝔼[𝑢𝑝|𝐽(𝐶) = 𝑗] = ℙ(𝐷(𝑣) = 0|𝐽(𝐶) = 𝑗)
= ℙ(𝐷(𝑣) = 0|𝐽(𝐶) = 𝑗, 𝐼(𝑣) = 1) ⋅ ℙ(𝐼(𝑣) = 1) + ℙ(𝐷(𝑣) = 0|𝐽(𝐶) = 𝑗, 𝐼(𝑣) = 0)
⋅ ℙ(𝐼(𝑣) = 0) =
1
2
+
1
2
ℙ(𝐷(𝑣) = 0|𝐽(𝐶) = 𝑗, 𝐼(𝑣) = 0) 
Since 𝐴 provides a 𝑛 − 1-strong-equillibrium then 𝐶 should not benefit from cheating. Formally, 
∀𝑝 ∈ 𝐶:
1
2
≥ 𝔼[𝑢𝑝|𝐼(𝐶) = 𝐽(𝐶)] ≥  𝔼[𝑢𝑝|𝐽(𝐶) = 𝑗] =
1
2
+
1
2
ℙ(𝐷(𝑣) = 0|𝐽(𝐶) = 𝑗, 𝐼(𝑣) = 0) 
Thus, we have ℙ(𝐷(𝑣) = 0|𝐽(𝐶) = 𝑗, 𝐼(𝑣) = 0) = 0, so 𝐷(𝑣) = 1. Indeed 1 = ¬(0 ⊕ 0). 
The second case 𝛼(𝑗) = 1, is symmetric.  
∎ 
In case 𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠(𝑗) = 0 and 𝐼(𝑣) = 0, by Lemma 1.1 we have that 𝐷(𝑣) = ¬(0 ⊕ 0) = 1, contradicting (2). 
∎ 
III. SINGULARITY OF THE SOLUTION ALGORITHM WHEN 𝑛 IS ODD 
Assume 𝐴 is an algorithm providing a 𝑛 − 1-strong-equilibrium when 𝑛 is odd. We can repeat the proof of Lemma 
1.1, replacing the claim with 𝐷(𝑣) = 𝐼(𝑣) ⊕ 𝛼(𝑗). 
The proof works exactly the same, but the result of this lemma doesn't contradict (2).  
Instead, we have that even number of nodes with an input equal to 1 results in 𝐷(𝑣) = 0 and odd number of nodes 
with an input equal to 1 results in 𝐷(𝑣) = 1. Thus, if we look at 𝐴 as a function that maps between the nodes’ inputs 
and the output of the distributed consensus, 𝐴 is exactly equal to the algorithm given in [1]. 
IV. A 𝑛 − 2-STRONG-EQULLIBRIUM 
Theorem 2 (A 𝑛 − 2-Strong-Equilibrium Algorithm) Assuming uniform distribution over the inputs and a synchronous 
ring of even size, the algorithm proposed in [1] works and provides a 𝑛 − 2-strong-equilibrium. 
 
Proof. To simplify, we shall start by assuming the ring is unidirectional. A method to discard this assumption 
regardless of the cheating coalition is shown in [2]. 
We shall present the algorithm proposed in [1]: 
 
Algorithm 1 (Afek et al. [1]): 
  do_consensus(input, id): 
1    my_rand := rand() 
2    ids_array.append(<id, input>) 
3    rand_sum := my_rand 
4    input_sum := input 
5    Send(<input, id, my_rand>, out_interface) 
6    for i = 1,…,n-1: 
7      tmp := Recv(in_interface) 
8      if tmp = null or not (tmp.input ∈ {0, 1}): 
9        REPORT CHEATER 
10     ids_array.append(<tmp.id, tmp.input>) 
11     rand_sum += tmp.rand 
12     input_sum += tmp.input 
13     Send(tmp, out_interface) 
14   end for 
15   tmp := Recv(in_interface) 
16   if tmp.input ≠ input or tmp.id ≠ id or tmp.rand ≠ my_rand: 
17     REPORT CHEATER 
18   sort ids_array by id 
19   if ∃id ∈ ids_array with ids_array.count(id) ≠ 1: 
20     REPORT CHEATER 
21   leader := ids_array[rand_sum % n] 
22   input_sum += leader.input 
23   if input_sum % 2 == 1: 
24     return 1 
25   else: 
26     return 0 
  end do_consensus 
     
Lemma 2.1 If all nodes in the ring comply with the algorithm, it maintains both validity and agreement, and 
ℙ(𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑠 0) = ℙ(𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑠 1) =
1
2
. 
 
Proof. Addressing validity – if every node got 0 as an input, then for every node in the ring 𝑢. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡_𝑠𝑢𝑚 will be 0, 
meaning that 𝑢. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡_𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑑 2 = 0 resulting in all nodes agreeing on 0. If every node got 1 as input, then for every 
node in the ring 𝑢. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡_𝑠𝑢𝑚 will be 𝑛 + 1, and since 𝑛 is even – it will result in 1 as consensus. If some nodes got 0 
and others got 1, every outcome is acceptable in terms of validity. 
Addressing agreement – if all nodes comply then every node after line 18 will have the exact same values for 
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑_𝑠𝑢𝑚, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡_𝑠𝑢𝑚 and 𝑖𝑑𝑠_𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦 (follows from a simple induction), which will result in all nodes agreeing on 
the same value. 
Addressing ℙ(𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑠 0) = ℙ(𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑠 1) =
1
2
  - we shall prove the following claims by induction on the 
number of nodes: 
1. Given nodes 𝑣1, 𝑣2, … 𝑣2𝑘: ℙ(∑ 𝑣𝑖 . 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 
2𝑘
𝑖=1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 2 = 0) = ℙ(∑ 𝑣𝑖. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡
2𝑘
𝑖=1  𝑚𝑜𝑑 2 = 1) =
1
2
  
2. Given nodes 𝑣1, 𝑣2, … 𝑣2𝑘; 
 ℙ(∑ 𝑣𝑖 . 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡
2𝑘
𝑖=1 + 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑚𝑜𝑑 2 = 0) = ℙ(∑ 𝑣𝑖. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡
2𝑘
𝑖=1 + 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 1) =
1
2
 
If 𝑛 = 2 (we shall denote the nodes as 𝑣1, 𝑣2): Addressing the first claim – there are 4 possible inputs that can be 
given to the nodes - <0,0> , <0,1> , <1,0> , <1,1>. In half of them the sum of all inputs is even, in the other half – odd. 
Addressing the second claim - if  𝑣1 and 𝑣2 both got 0 as an input – the sum (including the leader) is even. If both 
got 1 – the sum (including the leader) is odd. If  𝑣1 got 0 and 𝑣2 got 1 – then if 𝑣1 is elected leader they will decide on 
1, else they will decide on 0. The exact opposite result will occur if 𝑣1 got 1 and 𝑣2 got 0. In conclusion – in exactly 
half of the cases the sum (including leader) is even, and in the other half – odd. 
Now, assume the above claims applies to all rings of size 𝑛 = 2(𝑘 − 1). We shall prove it applies to a ring of size 
𝑛 = 2𝑘. 
Addressing claim 1 – By applying the same analysis done in the base case for nodes 𝑛2𝑘, 𝑛2𝑘−1 and by using the 
induction hypothesis, the claim is proven. 
Addressing claim 2 – Denote the nodes as 𝑣1, 𝑣2, … 𝑣2𝑘.  
If 𝑣2𝑘 and 𝑣2𝑘−1 aren't elected as leader, then their contribution to 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡_𝑠𝑢𝑚 is odd (exactly 1) half of the times 
and even (0 or 2) the other half. By induction hypothesis (claim 2) , we know that if one of the nodes 𝑣1, 𝑣2, … 𝑣2𝑘−2 
was elected leader, then in half of the cases their sum of inputs (including leader) is 0, and in the other half – it is 1. 
Thus the contribution of 𝑣2𝑘−1, 𝑣2𝑘 maintains the probability of 0 or 1 to be decided.  
If 𝑣2𝑘 or 𝑣2𝑘−1 are elected as leader, then by applying claim 1 on 𝑣1, 𝑣2, … 𝑣2𝑘−2 and claim 2 on 𝑣2𝑘−1, 𝑣2𝑘, the 
claim is proven. 
From claim 2, it is clear that ℙ(𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑠 0) = ℙ(𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑠 1) =
1
2
. 
∎ 
Each node in the ring is initialized with 3 values - < 𝑖𝑑, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡, 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 >. Denote 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝(𝑢) - the triplet of values 
with which 𝑢 is initialized in the beginning of the algorithm; and 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝(𝑣, 𝑢) – a triplet of values received by 𝑢 during 
the algorithm in which 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝(𝑣, 𝑢). 𝑖𝑑 =  𝑣. Note that 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 and 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 may or may not be the actual values with 
which 𝑣 was initialized in the beginning. Furthermore, the id 𝑣 may or may not be an id of an actual node in the ring. 
Let 𝑣 ∈ 𝐶, 𝑢 ∉ 𝐶 such that 𝑣 is the closest member of the coalition to 𝑢 from 𝑢's 𝑖𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒. Also, let 𝑚 be the 
number of nodes between 𝑣 and 𝑢, including u. It is clear that 𝑣 (as a member of the coalition) may lie regarding 𝑛 −
𝑚 of the triplets sent to 𝑢 (thus, giving the coalition control over 𝑛 − 𝑚 messages) but cannot affect 𝑚 of the triplets 
received by 𝑢 (𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝(𝑢) and the triplets of the 𝑚 − 1 nodes between 𝑣 and 𝑢). Further, 𝑣 receives these 𝑚 triplets after 
it had sent all 𝑛 − 𝑚 triplets controlled by him. Of course, 𝑣 cannot change the triplets it sends after it had sent them, 
which implies that any information that 𝑢 received from 𝑣 is independent of any information that 𝑣 received from 𝑢. 
In order to reflect this conclusion, we define the following: 
1. 𝑅(𝑣, 𝑢) – the set of nodes between 𝑣 and 𝑢, including 𝑢. 
2. 𝐿𝑖𝑒(𝑢) = {𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝(𝑤, 𝑢)|𝑤 ∉ 𝑅(𝑣, 𝑢)}. These triplets are fully controlled by 𝐶. 
3. 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑡ℎ(𝑢) = {𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝(𝑤, 𝑢)|𝑤 ∈ 𝑅(𝑣, 𝑢)}. These aren't controlled by C. 
4. 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑇(𝑢) = ∑ 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝 ∈𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑡ℎ(𝑢)  
5. 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝐿(𝑢) = ∑ 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝 ∈𝐿𝑖𝑒(𝑢)  
6. 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑇(𝑢) = ∑ 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝. 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝 ∈𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑡ℎ(𝑢)  
7. 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚𝐿(𝑢) = ∑ 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝. 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝 ∈𝐿𝑖𝑒(𝑢)  
 
Lemma 2.2 Given a coalition of cheaters denoted 𝐶, and a node 𝑢 ∉ 𝐶, then every id in 𝑢. 𝑖𝑑𝑠_𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦 has the same 
probability of 
1
𝑛
 to be elected as leader by 𝑢, regardless of the actions taken by 𝐶. 
 
Proof. This lemma has been explored and proved in [1], [2]. In short – 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝(𝑢) ∈  𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑡ℎ(𝑢) ≠ 𝜙 which means that 
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑇(𝑢) is uniformly distributed. Since 𝑢. 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑_𝑠𝑢𝑚 includes 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑇(𝑢) in the sum, 𝑢. 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑_𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛 
is uniformly distributed as well, which means that every value between 0 to 𝑛 − 1 has an equal chance to be selected 
as an index to 𝑢. 𝑖𝑑𝑠_𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦. 
∎ 
  
Lemma 2.3 Given a coalition of cheaters denoted 𝐶, and a node 𝑢 ∉ 𝐶, if the leader elected by 𝑢 is 𝑝 ≠ 𝑢 then 
𝑃(𝑢. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 = 1) = 𝑃(𝑢. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 = 0) =
1
2
.  
 
Proof. From the algorithm, after line 22 we have: 
𝑢. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡_𝑠𝑢𝑚 = 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑇(𝑢) +  𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝐿(𝑢) + 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝(𝑢. 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝑢). 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 
Since we have assumed a uniform distribution over the inputs, the probability that 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑇(𝑢) is odd is equal to the 
probability that it is even, i.e. 
1
2
. This implies that 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡_𝑠𝑢𝑚 has the same probability to be odd and even, regardless 
of the parity of 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝐿(𝑢)  +  𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝(𝑢. 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝑢). This proves Lemma 2.3.  
∎ 
 
Lemma 2.4 Assume a coalition of cheaters denoted 𝐶, and a node 𝑢 ∉ 𝐶, where 𝑢. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 ∈ 𝐶. 
If the leader elected by 𝑢 is 𝑢, then 𝐶 has full control over the decision of 𝑢. 
 
Proof. Since 𝑢. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 is a cheater, 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑇(𝑢)  =  𝑢. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡. After line 22: 
𝑢. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡_𝑠𝑢𝑚 = 𝑢. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 +  𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝐿(𝑢) + 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝(𝑢. 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝑢). 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 2 ⋅ 𝑢. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝐿(𝑢) 
Hence the result of the consensus algorithm is: 
𝑢. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 =  𝑢. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡_𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑑 2 = (2 ⋅ 𝑢. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝐿(𝑢)) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 2 = 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝐿(𝑢) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 2 
Which means that 𝑢's decision depends only on the values sent to 𝑢 from 𝑢. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒.  
∎ 
 
Lemma 2.5 Assume a coalition of cheaters denoted 𝐶, with |𝐶| = 𝑛 − 2. Also, assume 𝑢1, 𝑢2 ∉ 𝐶 aren't neighbors 
in the ring. In this case, 𝐶 has no incentive to cheat. 
 
Proof. Assume w.l.o.g, that 𝐶 prefers the consensus to be 1. For convenience, we shall divide our analysis to the 
following three cases: 
Case 1: 𝑢1, 𝑢2 received different 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 or 𝑖𝑑 values during the course of the algorithm. Then we can analyze this 
case as if 𝑢1 and 𝑢2 were on different rings, thus their decisions are independent. 
By 2.2: 
(1) ℙ(𝑢1. 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 𝑢1) =
1
𝑛
, ℙ(𝑢1. 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 ≠ 𝑢1) =
𝑛−1
𝑛
 
 It follows from 2.3 and 2.4 that: 
(2)  ℙ(𝑢1 . 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 = 1 | 𝑢1. 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 ≠ 𝑢1) =
1
2
 
(3) ℙ(𝑢1 . 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 = 1 | 𝑢1. 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 𝑢1) = 1 
Combining (1), (2) and (3): 
(4) ℙ(𝑢1. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 = 1) =
1
𝑛
+
𝑛−1
2𝑛
 
The exact same result applies to 𝑢2. As we explained, in this case 𝑢1. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 is independent of 𝑢2. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠, 
therefore the probability for a consensus to be reached over 1 is: 
(5) ℙ(𝑢1. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 = 1 ∧ 𝑢2. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 = 1) = (
1
𝑛
+
𝑛−1
2𝑛
)
2
=
1
4
(1 +
1
𝑛
)
2
≤1  
1
4
(1 +
1
4
)
2
<
1
2
 
Where ≤1 is a result of 𝑛 ≥ 4 (there are 2 non cheaters and an even non-zero number of coalition members). 
Therefore 𝐶 has no incentive to cheat in Case 1.  
 
Case 2: The 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 and 𝑖𝑑 values received by 𝑢1 and 𝑢2 during the course of the algorithm are identical, but the 
𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 values are different. In this case, the leader elected by 𝑢1 is the same as the one elected by 𝑢2. For convenience, 
we shall denote it as 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟, since both nodes choose the same leader in this case. 
By Lemma 2.2: 
(6) ℙ(𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 ≠ 𝑢1, 𝑢2) =
𝑛−2
𝑛
, ℙ(𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 𝑢1) =
1
𝑛
, ℙ(𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 𝑢2) =
1
𝑛
  
From Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4 we have: 
(7) ℙ(𝑢1. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 = 𝑢2. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 = 1  | 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 ≠ 𝑢1, 𝑢2) =
1
4
 
(8) ℙ(𝑢1. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 = 𝑢2. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 = 1 |𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 𝑢1) =
1
2
 
(9) ℙ(𝑢1. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 = 𝑢2. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 = 1 |𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 𝑢2) =
1
2
 
By combining (6) – (9), we can derive: 
(10) ℙ(𝑢1. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑢2. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 = 1) =
1
4
∗
𝑛−2
𝑛
+
1
2
∗
1
𝑛
+
1
2
∗
1
𝑛
=
1
4
+
1
2𝑛
≤
1
4
+
1
8
<
1
2
 
Thus 𝐶 has no incentive to cheat in Case 2 as well. 
 
Case 3: Nodes 𝑢1 and 𝑢2 receive the exact same triplets during the course of the algorithm. 
In this case at least one of the nodes will not choose itself as the leader. By Lemma 2.3 the probability of this node 
deciding on 1 is 
1
2
, and this bounds the probability of a consensus over this value. Hence, 𝐶 has no incentive to cheat 
in Case 3.  
By cases 1 – 3, Lemma 2.5 is proved.  
∎ 
 
Lemma 2.6 Assume a coalition of cheaters denoted 𝐶, and two nodes 𝑢1, 𝑢2 ∉ 𝐶 such that 
𝑢1 = 𝑢2. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒. Then ℙ(𝑢2. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 = 1) = ℙ(𝑢2. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 = 0) =
1
2
. 
 
Proof. By Lemma 2.3, if 𝑢2 chooses a leader other than itself, then: 
ℙ(𝑢2. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 = 1) = ℙ(𝑢2. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 = 0) =
1
2
 
If 𝑢2 chooses itself as a leader, then  𝑢2. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡_𝑠𝑢𝑚 = 2 ⋅ 𝑢2. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 + 𝑢1. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 +  𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝐿(𝑢) 
Since ℙ(𝑢1. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 1) = ℙ(𝑢2. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 1) =
1
2
 from the exact same arguments of Lemma 2.3 we have 
ℙ(𝑢2. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 = 1) = ℙ(𝑢2. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 = 0) =
1
2
. 
∎  
 
Lemma 2.7 Assume a coalition of cheaters denoted 𝐶 with |𝐶| = 𝑛 − 2, and two nodes 𝑢1, 𝑢2  ∉ 𝐶 such that 
𝑢1 = 𝑢2. 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒. Then there is no incentive for 𝐶 to cheat. 
 
Proof. Follows from Lemma 2.6.  
∎  
 
Proof of Theorem 2 (A 𝑛 − 2-Strong-Equilibrium Algorithm) 
Proof. From Lemma 2.1 we know that the algorithm maintains both validity and agreement when every node 
complies, and also that ℙ(𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑠 0) = ℙ(𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑠 1) =
1
2
. From Lemmas 2.5 and 2.7 we know that 
regardless of the position of the two non-cheaters (neighbors or not) there is no incentive for cheaters to cheat. Thus, 
the algorithm provides a 𝑛 − 2-strong-equilibrium.  
∎  
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have proved that problem of distributed consensus with a coalition of 𝑛 − 1 rational agents cannot 
be solved when 𝑛 is even, regardless of the network topology. Furthermore, we have proved that when 𝑛 is odd, there 
can be only one method to reach consensus – the parity of the sum of all inputs. 
Also, we have proved that the algorithm from [1] solves the problem of distributed consensus in a synchronous ring 
with a coalition of 𝑛 − 2 rational agents, when 𝑛 is even. Thus, we gave both an upper and a lower bound on the 
maximal size of a coalition supported by a correct protocol for the problem of distributed consensus with rational agents 
in this topology. 
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